BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS COMPLIANCE AND THE ENRON FRAUD

By

SALLY RAMAGE

 

Operations risk modelling is becoming more important. Different models allow correlations and applications for finance. Modelling has value for finance, especially institutions and INSURANCE COMPANIES.

Where is operation risk modelling in this area of finance and insurance? It is used in banks to control Capital Requirement.

The challenges are these:-

1.                  Mathematics has methodologies for calculating data, but not with real data. Banks now collect data but the challenge is – trying to model real data.

2.                  Diversification is also an issue.

3.                  How to mix internal data with external data.

The model used by banks at present will change in the next few years. There are issues of input data, enough data, quality of data, and how to mix objective data (eg. internal) with quality data. There are different approaches being used. Basel’s Capital Requirement data must be quality data, objective data and weights of these elements. There is still not a lot of internal bank data because banks are still not able to produce objective data. Quality data exercises can be challenged by insurance institutions. One must haggle from businesses what the frequency/qualitative data is. Qualitative data uses triggers such as quality budget. So after a few months of collecting bank data, they can analyse to see if it is working.

Certain types of risks are increasing. One can examine the frequency of how a risk might occur. Banks can use scenarios to train management. -  scenarios such as the Capital scenario. This is operation risk at the beginning of the process, beginning to understand what the real operation risks are. There are two ideas at present on this. One is using only high quality special data; the process is the Pareto analysis.

Limitations of this type of analysis are that conversion to Pareto distribution seems not to be the definitive solution because it needs a picture of the global severity distribution. The other problem is – what do you do when there is not enough data?

The Bank Capital can be calculated but the risk profile needs to be known. Also the risk in the particular bank. Data used now is joint external and scenario data to extract intelligence, but these carry big problems of operation risk.

 Regulators are cautious about correlations. How can future modelling assuage regulators fear? In the market situation, mostly mathematical calculation is used but it should be used with great caution because when real data is used in the model, the results are surprising. For example, use of diversification causes capital required to be calculated as half of that when another mathematical method is used. To calculate losses, you need to use cell correlations and a 36- cell regulatory matrix. Credit risk and operation risk are fundamentally different. If fundamental data is something about causes, then the problem is what data should be used in modelling for capital calculation?

For example, foregone revenue cannot be input into the model and theoretically, this is 25% of the total calculation. Also since events have multiple consequences, the model is not yet developed to match causes and consequences. The solution might be to include back-to-book-transactions as per calculating credit risk because consequences and causes are very well linked. Operation risk is not a transaction. It is different to credit risk There is also a difference between operation risk and business risk. Corporate culture is one driver of operation risk. Operation risk is causal-  it is based on correlative frequencies, eg. Information Technology disaster recovery event, fraud and general disaster are all items that can be stress-tested. For example flu pandemic is a human, physical and economic risk and will have different impact on market, credit and other areas.

Operation risk is basically “process management risk”.

 People understand it better than the concept of BASEL ACCORD.

 To determine what will happen in a bank, internal data is not enough to give a complete picture. You need external data also. Mathematical theories are not useful here. The model has to be bespoke to the individual bank. A model for losses in a big bank cannot be used for a small bank because of scale. So you have to scale the data. This is the most robust way of using external data. Experiments with synthetic data converge better with the model. Moreover external data has issues of quality. The method used must ensure that data is complete and is classified correctly. Using a mix of internal and external data, needs the external data to be scaled first to the profile of the particular financial institution. The method must be able to trigger a review of “severity parameter”.

 The Revco case an example.

Scenario analysis is difficult to perform because risk factors are identified by several sources. So the solution in the future might be, instead of a single scenario, a rectangle frequency from 5 to 20 years as the range of variation is more realistic.

Some institutions have quality controls but the cost of this and the complications might make it difficult to introduce this into the operation risk model. Is capital an approximate proxy for risk assessment? A lot is down to scenario analysis.  Are what are being measured the right items to be measured? Capital Requirement is one of the proxies, because of regulations. But other measures are risk factor and repetition capital model takes care of scenario analysis but capital model does not include losses of the future. Liquidity risk on the other hand is stress-tested.

There is cross-risk diversification- identifying which portion of the operation risk is coming from the other risk, say credit risk. There is also economic impact calculation for high-impact events, such as the New York Trade Centre bombings. .There is post-operative risk, risk that has never happened before. but can the model take into account  an event  that has not yet occurred?  This can be done by producing stress analysis, using internal data and stress data, and then get an expert opinion and by introducing possible losses and using Monte Carlo simulation. These risks can be put into the economic capital calculation and be Basel 2 compliant.

 

The European Union Banks

At present the European Union banks produce Pareto distribution quarterly and every five years. But using Pareto technique can lead to very unstable distribution.  There is big over-estimation of capital requirement, sometimes by more than a country’s Gross National Product. With the Pareto distribution technique, even a small variation produces big changes in capital requirement. The solution may be to merge different banks’ databases where the size of the bank and the operation control environments are similar. But in practice this is unrealistic because control environments may not be similar. Alternatively it might be possible to merge directly, scaling down to similar size using gross margin or to calculate an individual bank’s own scaling factor, applying different weights. Possibly, then “capital at risk” might be calculated.  For instance, capital requirement today for Spanish banks is 5% of GDP, but regulators say it should be 8% of Gross Domestic Product. At present the calculation models used by banks, when they are used, can circumvent Basle Accord regulations, if accepted by regulators, because they have no Audit Trail.

 

A summary of Risk measurement and systemic risk

Research on risk measurement and systemic risk-related issues, has progressed substantially since 1995 by the value-at-risk (VaR) methodology.  How risk could be quantitatively measured and what the meaning of such measures are explained in several academic papers.. In 1997, the Asian crisis erupted, triggered by and itself triggering events that were beyond the bounds envisioned by standard Value at Risk methodology. Systemic banking crises, contagion and monitoring were issue to be addressed. The series of banking and currency crises that emerged in various parts of the world during the past two decades suggests that financial stability is not to be taken for granted. The term “systemic risk” simply means the danger that problems in a single financial institution might spread and such contagion could disrupt the normal functioning of the entire financial system.

 

Banking stability and systemic crises

The theory of banking based on liquidity risk sharing, with banks emerging as providers of the required liquidity insurance showed how, under asymmetric information, bank runs can emerge in such a fractional reserve banking system. Allowing for the possibility of bank runs, the Diamond/Dybvig [1] model is not able to explain the causes of banking crises. Extensions of the model have introduced uncertainty about asset returns to proxy for the impact of the business cycle on the valuation of bank assets. In these models with aggregate shocks to asset returns, financial crises are driven by fundamentals. Shocks to asset returns by reducing the value of bank assets. Despite its widespread use in theoretically analysing financial instability, the model and its various extensions do not provide a completely plausible description of actual patterns of banking crises. In the latest version of the Allen and Gale model a market for long-term assets is introduced into the analysis enabling banks to liquidate these assets. Liquidation costs are therefore endogenous. As a result, asset markets provide a transmission mechanism that serves to channel the effect from the liquidation of assets by some banks to other banks in the economy. If a sufficient number of banks are forced to liquidate their assets and the demand for liquidity rises above a certain level, asset prices will move sharply. This may, in turn, force other banks into insolvency and exacerbate the original crisis.

As a result, the model, compared with earlier theories, provides a more realistic explanation of how and why financial crises may develop. It also highlights the importance of asset market liquidity for the avoidance of financial crises. One model is about the failure to recognise the role of interbank credit. In such a model, banks compete in the loan market, while the interbank market serves as an insurance mechanism against deposit withdrawals due to liquidity shocks. Mergers affect bank balance sheets via increased concentration and potentially enhanced cost efficiency, while also altering the structure of liquidity shocks. The model highlights the importance of functioning interbank markets for financial stability and sheds some light on potential trade-offs between antitrust and supervisory policies.

 

Contagion across markets

Dungey et al identified contagion by looking at daily movements in bond spreads in an effort to quantify the effects of unanticipated regional shocks across borders. The resulting contagion measure controls for common global shocks, country specific shocks and regional factors. They find contagion originating from the Russian default, with the measured level of the effect larger for emerging economies. However, the proportion of total volatility attributable to contagion varies widely across countries and is not always more substantial for developing countries. Contagion effects are found to be widely distributed across both developed and developing markets, making contagion a phenomenon reserved not only for developing countries.

 

As to contagion across markets and countries, despite its importance for financial market stability, it remains less than completely understood. Contagion is at the heart of any analysis of financial crises, because it is contagion that makes the initial shock a truly systemic event. To understand financial sector risks, one has to deal with the origin of these risks as well as the channels of propagation. The increasing use of complex risk transfer instruments and speed of financial market transactions add to the complexity and rapidity of the potential propagation of shocks, making these risks difficult to gauge. Contagion can therefore be viewed as the propagation mechanism that causes small idiosyncratic or systematic shocks to have systemic consequences.

 

Systemic monitoring

Systemic events can impose substantial social costs on the affected economies, as bank runs; for example, will disrupt credit relations and efficiency, leading to non-trivial direct and indirect effects in the form of output losses. Systemic monitoring and the analysis of systemic risks are high on the policy agendas of central banks  Can market-based indicators  be usefully employed to predict banking fragility? Useful and well-behaved indicators can be derived from stock market data but to date the focus has been much on subordinated debt spreads. Market-based indicators are useful in predicting banking fragility. Market-based indicators can be used in supervisors’ early warning models.

 

Exposures to domestic interbank market

To monitor counterparty exposures in the domestic interbank market, a model known as the Riksbank model uses data detailing the largest un-collateralised exposures of the four major players in the Swedish banking system by exposing a proxy for the Swedish banking system, the four biggest banks, to solvency shocks originating from outside the interbank market and assessing how the system is affected. The results were that Swedish domestic direct contagion effects are less than what might have been expected in the Swedish banking system. Where one of the large banks is assumed to fail, other banks are found not to suffer direct losses that would reduce their capital ratio significantly below the regulatory level. Similar results were found for the risk of direct contagion from abroad, which mainly arises from foreign exchange settlement exposures.

 

Market liquidity

Banks are providers of insurance for liquidity risk. They serve this function by following a liquidity immunisation strategy, implemented via individual asset markets and interbank credit markets, to guard themselves against the possible effects of forced asset liquidation.

 

Study of the Treasury market

Individual market participants are likely to underestimate potential price movements resulting from shocks to markets and predictably underestimate the risk of their own exposures. This is based on standard market microstructure models. Basel 2001 indicators are constructed to evaluate how liquidity has evolved since the 1997 Asian  banking crisis and to examine the determinants of changes in liquidity. The analysis showed that, having deteriorated during the Asian and Russian financial crises, market liquidity has broadly recovered to pre-crisis levels.  Basel 2001 estimators are now commonly used to assess the tails of return distributions.

 

The Enron fraud

The Enron fraud indicates that the pendulum may not be very far from swinging back between the two extremes of very pervasive public intervention and complete laissez-faire. And public intervention is needed to support the orderly functioning of financial markets.

Risks in the financial sector

The increasing complexity of the financial system renders it more and more difficult to identify the origin of risks.  Managing the risks associated with the uncertainty and risk of the real sector is at the core of financial intermediation. The way in which risk is spread within the financial system varies over time in relation to several factors, including market and regulatory developments. Enron fraud highlight  the importance of two aspects that characterise risk propagation today, the growing use of complex financial instruments to assume and transfer risks and the abrupt changes in international capital movements. Evidence suggests that the markets for credit risk transfer instruments are concentrated in terms of dealers and ultimate risk-takers. As to abrupt changes in international capital movements, lack of data on many important players in the global financial system is the black hole on the possible sources of destabilising capital movements.

Enron: failure to deliver transparency

There seems to be a broad consensus that this incident points not only to truly illegal actions and infringements of ethical codes of conduct, but also to ineffective market discipline exercised by Enron’s equity and debt holders, due to lack of adequate transparency. Enron owed much of its initial success to deregulation, both in the gas and electricity sectors and in a variety of other areas. It was publicly perceived as a highly successful company. Only when the company was approaching bankruptcy did market analysts react and shareholders and creditors become aware of its vulnerabilities. Only then did attention focus on the risks entailed in its extensive off-balance sheet transactions. Inadequate accounting rules are partly responsible for the failure to uncover highly risky operations or for the inadequate disclosure of complex off-balance sheet transactions. The extensive and parallel consulting business with Enron that auditors Public policies are required to ensure the smooth operation of market discipline, which is also of utmost importance for the functioning of the financial system. The call for an international initiative to update accounting standards to deal with the complexity of derivative financial instruments is important.

The Enron fraud as an incentive for declaring conflicts of interest

The Enron fraud must serve as a powerful incentive to speed up efforts in this field.  The Enron fraud highlights the question of adequate oversight of financial activities undertaken by non-financial corporations. Despite being the main dealer, market-maker and liquidity provider in important areas of the energy and other derivatives markets, Enron was not required, by either regulators or market practice, to disclose information to its counterparties, or to set aside capital against its trading risks. The absence of such mechanisms prevented an early detection of the problem and might have created incentives for imprudent risk-taking. The Enron fraud illustrates that the banking system is not sufficiently alert to possible conflicts of interest. The combination of auditing and consulting in the Enron fraud is only one example of conflicts of interest. Such conflicts of interest arise whenever a financial institution provides corporate finance and similar services to a specific client who issues securities in which the financial institution can invest its own funds or those of its clients and gives cause for concern and deserves careful consideration by public authorities

If a player such as Enron is not under the control of regulators, it should be under tight market control exercised by analysts, accountants, shareholders and lending banks. If these endogenous controllers fail to be alert, they should be sanctioned in the form of monetary losses or regulatory constraints. The important lesson that emerged from the Enron fraud is about excessive scope and not about unnecessary strength. The Enron fraud highlights weak responses by the authorities to a deteriorating situation. The signals provided by market authorities and policymakers were not strong enough to ensure adequate transparency and avoid conflicts of interest. While some initiatives to improve the situation were put forward over a relatively long period before the Enron incident, the prevailing pressure from the corporate sector prevented substantive achievements. Regulators and policymakers have something in common with policemen.

 

Strong public intervention is necessary on those occasions when markets fail to work properly. This should not be confused with a wide and pervasive intervention in the markets as public authorities used to do in the past. .Those responsible for the oversight of markets should signal their commitment to well-defined and effective intervention, when needed, and so contribute to the stability of the financial system.

ENDS

 

 

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[1] D Diamond and P Dybvig, “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy 91, 1983, pp 401-19.